I. INTRODUCTION
The number of unemployed workers at a given time is the net balance of¯ows in and out of unemployment. Over time, the unemployment rate increases if in¯ows grow faster than out¯ows. Spain's labour market o ers a good example of how unemployment steadily rises when the economy is unable to create jobs for new entrants and for displaced workers. In the mid-1970s the unemployment rate was around 4%, ten years later the rate had increased to almost 22% (see Fig. 1 ). Labour market rigidities have repeatedly been blamed for such an intense and long-lasting destruction of employment.
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Although the Spanish labour market of the 1990s is far more¯exible than that of the 1970s or early 1980s, the exit rate from unemployment is still considered low, even by European standards.
2 Hence, there is high and persistent rate of unemployment in Spain, although it diminished signi® cantly in the second half of the 1980s. The 1984 Employment Promotion Programme ± based on fostering ® xed-term employment contracts ± reduced employers' reluctance to hire new workers. The reason being that dismissing (temporary) workers became much easier, and also cheaper. Lured by the advantages of the new employment relationship, employers replaced permanent employees with temporary ones, to the extent that in 1991 one-third of the employed had a ® xed-term contract.
More recently, unemployment again rose quickly in Spain, by eight percentage points from 1991 to 1994. Although this can largely be attributed to a cyclical downturn, the depth of the employment crisis raises some questions about the dynamics of the Spanish labour market. For instance, how is the use of ® xed-term contracts a ecting thē ow into unemployment? What factors are determinants of the¯ow out of unemployment?
This paper takes the latter strand of analysis to contribute to a better understanding of the dynamics of the Spanish labour market. We study the determinants of the transitions out of unemployment by using a multinomial logit model. Such framework permits to estimate the e ects of a number 3 This framework has been used by a number of studies. For example Barron and Mellow (1981) , and Proterba and Summers (1995) . The advantage of this methodology is its simplicity as compared with that based on duration models. Although the EPA contains information on the unemployment spell duration, matched ® les reveal many inconsistencies in the individual s' responses. of variables on an individual' s transition from unemployment to either employment or inactivity. The data used are obtained from matched ® les of the quarterly Active Population Survey (EPA), for the period second quarter of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 1995. This period includes a complete business cycle, with a high in 1991 and a trough in 1993, and employment recovery since the latter date. To reduce heterogeneity we consider men aged 20± 59 who possess work experience and are unemployed at a given quarter of the indicated period. Transitions out of unemployment are obtained by workers' labour market status in two consecutive quarters.
One of the main ® ndings in this article is a di erential e ect of unemployment insurance on the re-employment probability when comparing periods before and after 1992. We are tempted to link this result to the reform of the unemployment insurance system carried out in April of 1992, which tightened eligibility requirements and curtailed bene® t amounts.
In what follows, Section II presents the empirical framework; Section III describes the data; in Section IV we present and discuss the results; and in Section V we provide some conclusions and interpretations of the main ® ndings.
II. EMPIRI CAL FRAMEWORK:
A MULTI NOMIAL LOGIT
To study the determinants of labour market transitions, we use a multinomial logit model (Maddala, 1983 4 This multinomial logit speci® cation can be regarded as an approximation to the reduced form of a three-state structural model for optimal participation and search. See Lancaster (1990), pp. 128± 42. 5 The distinction between unemployment and inactive persons is made by the labour force survey according to standard criteria. A worker is considered unemployed if he or she did not work last week, is actively looking for work, and is in the condition of starting work in the two weeks following the date of the interview. 6 We concentrate on men because we lack the relevant information on family background which is crucial for studying labour market transitions of women, such as the number of other members in the household and their labour market situation. 7 Because of the EPA's rotation scheme, a sixth of the individual s interviewed in a given quarter is not present in the subsequent quarter. Of the remaining sample, about 15% is lost because of attrition. Note that a worker can be in the sample more than once if he remained unemployed for more than one quarter or he experienced more than one spell of unemployment while present in the survey.
employed, leaves the labour force or remains unemployed, respectively; and X is a vector of individual characteristics and other factors that are believed to a ect labour market transitions. The probability that individual i experiences a transition from unemployment to employment is:
and the probability that the individual leaves the labour force is:
The indicated speci® cation requires independence of the three labour force states, where unemployment is taken as the base category.
4 Thus, the estimated e ects are obtained relative to the e ect of the respective variable on the conditional probability of remaining unemployed. Among the set of explanatory variables X, we include the following set of variables.
(i) Demographi c characteristics. Age dummies for ® veyear brackets, ® ve educational dummies, and marital status. (ii) Previous labour market experience. Situation right before starting job search (left a job, was in school, other); reason for job loss (end of contract, left or lost a job, other); previous sector of employment (agriculture, industry, construction, trade/hotel, other services); duration of previous job (less than 3 months, 3± 5 months, 6± 11 months, 12± 35 months, 36 or more months) (iii) Unemployment spell and job search. Whether attending school or following training courses while looking for work or not; a dummy for the pressure or willingness to take a job (the worker is ready to accept a job even though it implies changing residence and work task, and lower than expected wage and occupation); time out of work and looking for a job (less than 3 months, 3± 5 months, 6± 11 months, 12± 24 months, 24 or more months); situation at the public employment o ce (registered and receiving unemployment insurance bene® ts, registered without bene® ts, not registered).
(iv) Other variables. Dummies for EPA rotation groups, seasonal dummies, and year dummies.
Among the factors that can a ect the transitions out of unemployment we pay special attention to receipt of unemployment insurance bene® ts (UI), duration of the unemployment spell, and the business cycle as picked up by year dummies. Furthermore, we create interaction terms between UI receipt and unemployment duration, and between UI receipt and year dummies. These interaction terms serve to ascertain how the UI receipt e ect on the re-employment probability changes according to the values of the other two variables. The time period available expands from the second quarter of 1987 to the fourth quarter of 1995. This period includes part of the phase of strong employment growth that lasted until the early 1990s, the deep employment crisis of 1992 and 1993, and the period of economic recovery that started in 1994. Therefore, the data permit to analyse labour market transitions over a complete cycle of the Spanish economy.
III
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In this article we ® rst use a general sample, and later a slightly more restricted one. For selecting the larger sample we start with all men aged 20± 59, 6 unemployed at a given quarter of the period 1987:II to 1995:IV, after having worked before. By retaining those persons who were interviewed in the subsequent quarter, we obtain a sample of 130 669 observations . 7 Then we exclude workers for whom 8 Workers who report unemployment duration ± time looking for a job ± longer than time since leaving the previous job may have started their job search well before becoming unemployed. Otherwise, the discrepancy between the two variables may result from error. 9 For the transition from unemployment to the jth situation, the marginal e ect of an exogenous variable, x, is obtained at the sample means applying the formula:
where k = 1, 2 and p j is the average worker transition to state j.
the variable values for time since leaving the previous job, unemployment duration or situation at the employment o ce are missing (2541 observations ). Because information on previous job's characteristics is only available for people who left their job less than 36 months ago, we exclude 19 169 observations where such information is missing. Also, we exclude workers who reported unemployment duration of more than 36 months (2885 observations ). 8 We are left with a sample of 106 174 individuals. The restricted sample, to be described later, serves to take a closer look at the e ect of unemployment insurance on labour market transition probabilities.
In the following section we present the maximum likelihood estimates of the multinomial logit parameters. We adopt the usual normalization rule of setting the parameters equal to zero in the equation for workers who remain unemployed in the subsequent quarter.
IV. ESTI MATION RESULTS
To study the determinants of exit rates from unemployment to employment and out of the labour force, we consider the labour force status in quarter t + 1 of unemployed men in quarter t. In the sample used, of all unemployed men in a given quarter of the time period available, 24.85% obtained a job in the subsequent quarter, and 3.93% left the labour force. Table 1 contains the results of estimating the multinomial logit model that can be applied to the data, as well as the corresponding derivatives.
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As expected, the re-employment probability decreases with age. Such probability is a third lower for 50± 54 year old workers, and a half lower for those aged 55± 59, as compared with the average worker in the sample. On the other hand, workers in these two age groups are signi® cantly more likely to drop out of the labour force. Workers 55± 59 years old are twice as likely to leave the labour force as the average individual in the sample. The variable education increases the likelihood of re-employment only for workers with a vocational degree. Married men are also more likely to become employed and less likely to leave the labour force by 33% and 28%, respectively.
Unemployed men attending school or following training courses are less likely to become employed and more likely to drop out of the labour force. Workers in this situation, 4.7% of the sample, have low attachment to the labour force because their opportunity cost of unemployment is probably low. An indicator of labour force attachment or pressure to accept a job can be obtained through a dummy that we call`willingness to accept a job'. It takes on one if the worker indicates that he is ready to take a job even though it implies moving, changing the type of work, and lower than expected wage and occupation. Around 29% of unemployed men report to be willing to accept a job under those conditions. Despite that disposition, their re-employment probability is signi® cantly lower than that for comparable workers. However, those workers' determination to obtain a job appears re¯ected in their higher attachment to the labour market. They are 21% less likely to leave the labour force than the average unemployed man in the sample who is not willing to accept a job under the referred conditions. Most experienced workers indicated that, right before starting their search for work, they had separated from a job. However, there are workers in the sample who indicated that they were not working. We have included in the regressions dummies to control for those who were in school (2%), or were in the military, doing housework or other activity (4%). Those who were students prior to looking for work are signi® cantly more likely to leave the labour force. Among people who were working prior to their job search, we can distinguish them by the reason for job loss; the main reason being end of contract (72%). Laid-o workers and job leavers for other reasons (early retirement, quitting, etc.) are less likely to become employed and more likely to drop out of the labour force than those whose contract ended. This result re¯ects the fact that workers with a ® xed-term contract move more often from one job to the other. It means that they are more employable and, at the same time, that they share a higher risk of experiencing unemployment. Hence, a higher labour turnover results from the institution of ® xed-term contracts.
Dummies for sector of employment show that re-employment probabilities are particularly high among agriculture sector (farming and ® shing) workers, and strikingly low among service sector workers. The result for agriculture workers is no surprise given the usually short duration of agriculture jobs. This implies that workers are obliged to move from job to job with high frequency. The result for the service sector cannot be so easily justi® ed. It may be due to the fact that service sector workers form a very heterogeneous group. Tenure in the previous job of one year or more reduces the likelihood of becoming employed. Workers who held their previous job for 3 years or longer are 14% less likely to become employed than the average worker in the sample. If that job was in the public sector, the re-employment probability decreases further, and the probability of leaving the labour force increases.
Before discussing the e ects on labour market transitions of unemployment duration, year dummies, and the worker's situation at the public employment o ce, some comments on the e ects of seasonal and rotation-group dummies are in order. Seasonal dummies refer to the initial quarter of the two consecutive quarters from which we assess labour market transitions. We ® nd that the probability of transition to employment increases signi® cantly in the second and fourth quarters of the year. Note that the second quarter marks the beginning of tourist sector jobs, and the fourth quarter dummy may pick up the Christmas and New-Year job openings. On the other hand, the probability of leaving the labour force appears higher for the third and fourth quarters. Regarding the rotation-group dummies, it seems that workers in the ® fth interview show a higher probability to become employed. Also, workers in the third, fourth and ® fth interview seem to be more likely to become inactive.
The signi® cant e ect of rotation-group dummies indicates some bias in the individual' s responses. In particular, the e ect on transition out of the labour force may indicate that some people are borderline between unemployment and inactivity. If asked a su cient number of consecutive quarters, their responses tend to be closer to the latter status.
Unemployment duration, year dummies and unemployment insurance
The e ects of unemployment duration, year dummies, and unemployment insurance bene® ts on labour market transitions deserve separate consideration, particularly because they are related to each other. First we focus on the estimated e ects of these variables as reported in Table 1 . It is clear from such table that unemployment duration dummies have a negative and very signi® cant impact on employment transitions. The re-employment probability decreases as time out of work extends. 1 0 It is apparent that the e ect is roughly linear up to the second year out of work. On the other hand, no e ect of unemployment duration on the probability of leaving the labour force is obtained, except for the fact that the dummy 12± 23 months obtains a negative and signi® cant coe cient.
Year dummies are deemed to pick up the e ect of the economic cycle on employment transitions. They also obtain very signi® cant coe cients as re¯ected in Table 1 . The re-employment probability increased up to 1989, decreased in 1992, plummeted in 1993, and started to recover in 1994. Years 1992 and 1993 are of strong employment decline in Spain (see Fig. 1 ). Thereafter, employment increased steadily. Regarding the transition to inactivity, the coe cients for year dummies are positive and signi® cant from 1990 to 1994. Although the decline in the re-employment probability is deepest in 1993 (37%), the increase in the probability of leaving the labour force is largest in 1992 (78%). This is probably related to the kind of employment adjustment that took place in Spain at the time. Many permanent workers lost their jobs at the early stages of the employment crisis. Because these are more likely to be older workers, they are expected to show a higher propensity to retire early.
Assessing the impact of the unemployment insurance bene® ts on labour market transitions with the data at hand poses several problems.
1 1 Certainly we can construct dummies from the survey question which asks of workers to indicate their situation at the public employment o ce (INEM). The possible answers are: (1) Register receiving contributory or assistance unemployment bene® ts, (2) Register without receiving bene® ts, and (3) Not registered. On average, 47% of unemployed men in the sample report to be receiving unemployment bene® ts at a given quarter, and 5% indicate not to be registered at the INEM. The problem with this information is that some unemployed people may have applied for UI and could be waiting for response from the INEM at the moment of survey interview. Because the EPA does not provide information on application for bene-® ts, we can check the situation at the employment o ce in the subsequent quarter. By doing so, we ® nd that 15% of the unemployed not receiving UI at the sample's initial quarter report to be receiving bene® ts in the subsequent quarter (8279 persons). If we consider UI recipients workers who receive bene® ts at the initial or subsequent quarter, we may obtain a more accurate measure of the number of people on unemployment insurance. However, by doing this we are likely to overstate the (negative) e ect on the re-employment probability of the UI receipt variable. The reason is that we do not observe situations in which after having applied for UI, the worker became re-employed even though UI actually was or could have been granted. With these shortcomings in mind, we can still estimate the UI e ect on labour market transitions by creating dummies for each of the three possible situations at the employment o ce. We try three possibilities. First, we create the UI dummy that takes on one if the worker is registered and receives UI either in the initial or the subsequent quarter; second, we rede® ne such dummy by making it equal to one only if the worker is registered and receives bene® ts in the initial quarter; and third, we estimate the multinomial regressions excluding the unemployed who were not receiving bene® ts in the initial quarter and indicated to be doing so in the subsequent quarter. The ® rst strategy corresponds to that of Table 1 , and the particular results from the other two cases are contained in Table 2 .
As Table 1 shows, receipt of bene® ts as de® ned in this case, reduces signi® cantly the re-employment probability by 0.1118, which represents almost a 50% decline with respect to that of the sample's average worker registered without receiving bene® ts. Also, it is found that the dummy for not being registered at the employment o ce obtains a positive and signi® cant coe cient, although the derivative is small. In addition, receipt of bene® ts signi® cantly reduces the probability of leaving the labour force, and absent INEM registration increases it by 50%.
As indicated earlier, the de® nition for UI receipt dummy used in Table 1 can overstate such a variable' s e ect on the employment transition. To gauge the extent to which that can happen we also use the two alternative strategies described above. Table 2 shows that when we de® ne the UI dummy as equal to one only when the worker is receiving bene® ts in the initial quarter, its e ect on employment transition is signi® cant, albeit quite small. The derivative is one-tenth of that reported in Table 1 . Moreover, by excluding UI claimants who were granted bene® ts with delay (as we can ® nd out by looking at the subsequent quarter), we obtain a positive and signi® cant coe cient for the impact of UI receipt dummy on transition to employment. In this case the derivative is 0.0733, which translates to a reduction in the re-employment probability of 27.5%, almost half of the reduction in the expected probability obtained from estimates in Table 1 . Thus, although it is hard to estimate the actual impact UI receipt on employment transition with Notes: 1. The sample is composed of unemployed men at a given quarter of the period 1987± 95, who were interviewed in the subsequent quarter, and had held a wage and salary job not in the agricultural sector. See text for more details on sample selection. 2. Speci® cation for the three multinomial regressions is similar to that whose estimated coe cients are fully reported in Table 1 , except for the inclusion of interaction terms.
1 2 If we de® ne the expected duration of unemployment spells as the inverse of the re-employment probability, it takes about 12 months to obtain a job for the average worker in the sample. This period will be 6 months longer for UI recipients according to estimates in Table 1 , and 3.3 months longer if we consider estimates in the lower panel of Table 2 . 1 3 Fully reported results for Table 2 and for Table 3 , are available from the author upon request.
EPA data, we can say that the e ect is signi® cant and likely to be close to the latter result reported.
1 2
V ariations in the e ect of unemployment insurance
In this subsection we address the following questions:
(1) Does the e ect of UI on labour market transitions vary across di erent lengths of unemployment duration? (2) Has such a ect changed along the business cycle? and, (3) Has the 1992 reforms of the UI system a ected the reemployment probability of UI recipients? To answer these questions we use a more restricted data sample. We exclude workers whose previous job was in the agricultural sector (15 970 observations), or was not a wage and salary job (3788 observations). By doing so, we expect to reduce heterogeneity in the sample, given that agriculture workers are subject to a di erent UI system, and that non-wage/salary workers are ineligible for unemployment insurance bene® ts. Table 3 reports the multinomial logit estimates for the particular dummy variables on which we focus our attention.
1 3 For UI receipt, we use the same de® nition as in Table  1 . The corresponding dummy takes on one if the individual receives bene® ts in either the initial or the subsequent quarter. The multinomial logit regressions are speci® ed as in Table 1 , except for the inclusion of interaction terms. The ® rst panel of Table 3 shows that by restricting the sample, the coe cients for the dummy variables on which we are focusing do not change much with respect to those reported in Table 1 .
Given the rules of the Spanish unemployment insurance system (see Appendix), as time out of work lengthens, the amount of bene® ts received decreases. Thus, one can expect 1 4 Narendranathan and Stewart (1993) present estimates of the variation of bene® t e ect throughout the unemployment spell in the United Kingdom. For Spain, Bover et al. (1996) ® nd a declining hazard as unemployment duration increases. 1 5 We also estimated separated equations for several time periods, and found the change in bene® t e ect on the re-employment probability to be the most noticeable di erence in estimates by periods. 1 6 The fact that UI reform was in 1992 makes it harder to draw any conclusion about possible changes of bene® t e ect on the re-employment probabilit y over the business cycle. One could expect such e ect to increase in recessions years because, as found in this article, UI receipt discourages workers from dropping out of the labour force. a progressive weakening of the UI (negative) e ect on employment transition along the unemployment spell. To test this one needs to analyse re-employment probabilities according to UI status at di erent points of the unemployment spell.
1 4 The data sample used in this article does not allow for this because we only observe labour market status at two consecutive quarters.
The data contain a cross-section of individuals whose incomplete unemployment spell ± as reported in the initial quarter ± can vary from one month to three years. Thus, we can estimate a multinomial logit model with interaction terms between duration dummies and the UI receipt dummy. By doing so, we are able to ascertain the UI e ect on labour market transitions across di erent lengths of unemployment duration. The results are presented in the second panel of Table 3 . It is clear that the negative e ect of UI receipt on the re-employment probability is very strong for workers in the ® rst two months of their unemployment spell, it is signi® cantly smaller in the 3± 5 month bracket, declines further for durations of 6± 11 months, and stays roughly constant from there on. However, note that the e ect is still quite important for UI recipients who have been unemployed for one year or longer. In the latter case, the re-employment probability declines by one third, which compares to a decline of more than 50% for UI recipients whose incomplete unemployment duration is shorter than six months.
We can also examine how the e ect of UI receipt on the re-employment probability changed over the period 1987± 95. This is an interesting exercise for at least two reasons. One reason is that in this period we observe a phase of increasing employment, and another phase of declining employment. Thus, the data allow for exploring the e ect of UI in a context of economic¯uctuations. The other reason is that unemployment insurance rules were modi® ed in April 1992, making bene® ts signi® cantly less generous. As re¯ected in the Appendix, such reform reduced duration and the amount of bene® ts. In addition, bene® t became subject to the income tax since 1994.
As the third panel of Table 3 shows, some of the interaction terms between UI receipt and year dummies are signi® -cantly di erent from zero, in particular UI*1994 and UI*1995, which obtain a positive coe cient. On the other hand, UI*1992 obtains a negative and signi® cant coe cient at the 10% level. These results suggest that by making the unemployment insurance system less generous, the labour authority may have reduced the negative incentive of bene-® ts on the re-employment probability. However, the goal of the reform was achieved with delay. In fact, the negative and signi® cant coe cient for UI*1992 suggests that the reemployment probability among UI recipients was at its lowest in that year. This may be related to the timing of the economic recession and, also, to the fact that many permanent workers lost their jobs around that date. It is in 1993 when the UI negative e ect on the re-employment probability appears to start declining. This is consistent with the fact that it is not until the beginning of 1994 when the majority of UI recipients had become eligible under the new rules.
As compared with the average worker in the sample who was registered without bene® ts, the re-employment probability of a UI recipient was 30% lower in the period 1994± 95, and about 50% lower in the period 1987± 91. Because the reform of the UI system coincided with the beginning of a period of labour shake out, followed by a weak recovery, its impact was probably smaller than it could have been in a phase of employment growth. If the e ect of UI on the re-employment probability depends on the business cycle, we cannot separate out the latter's contribution to the observed weakening of the UI e ect from that attributable to the UI reform. Because the data set used comprises a whole business cycle, we are more con® dent that a reduced generosity of the unemployment insurance system has been determinant. 
V. CONCLUSIONS
In this article we shed light on the dynamics of the Spanish labour market by analysing the determinants of transitions out of unemployment over the period 1987± 95. We devoted special attention to the e ect on the re-employment probability of the receipt of unemployment bene® ts, duration of the unemployment spell, and the business cycle as proxied by year dummies. For analysing the e ect of UI receipt on labour market transitions using matched EPA ® les, we pointed out some problems and o ered alternative estimates. We used interaction terms for gauging the impact of bene® t receipt on re-employment probabilities along the unemployment spell and throughout the period 1987± 95.
Despite data limitations, we found a negative and signi® -cant impact of UI receipt on the transition to employment and also on the transition to inactivity. In addition, the e ect on the re-employment probability appears stronger for shorter spells of unemployment, but it is still quite high for unemployment durations longer than one year. More importantly, we obtained evidence of a di erential e ect of UI over the period of study. Although in 1993 the negative e ect of UI receipt on the re-employment probability declined, as indicated by the corresponding interaction term, it is in 1994 and 1995 when the estimated e ect became signi® -cantly smaller than in previous years.
Given the modi® cation of the unemployment insurance law carried out in April 1992, one can interpret the latter result as a change in job search behaviour among UI recipients. By reducing the generosity of the unemployment insurance system, the Spanish labour authority has provided a natural experiment for assessing the impact of unemployment insurance on labour market transitions. It is beyond the scope of this paper to study the extent to which the new unemployment insurance system has contributed and will contribute to reduce unemployment in Spain. This is worth investigating, together with the e ects of curtailed unemployment insurance bene® ts on labour market welfare.
